India’s Longstanding Pursuit for a Permanent Seat at the United Nations Security Council: Do the Indians Have a Case Even?

Abstract

The discussion of reforming the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been escalated with the changing global balance of power and more dissatisfaction with its post-1945 era. The paper is a critical analysis of the desire of India to get a permanent seat in the UNSC in the wider context of the suggested institutional reforms. It assesses alternative reform agendas, specifically those that are promoted by the G4, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) alliance, and the African Union, and evaluates the political possibility of Charter amendment. The paper evaluates the main arguments by India to permanent membership such as population, democratic qualifications, economic development, military strength, peacekeeping service and presence in the international arena. The paper presents arguments that several of the justifications given by India are structurally irrelevant to the requirements of UNSC reforms or normatively disputed using comparative indicators and evaluations by third parties. Although the paper recognizes the obsolete nature of the current composition of the Council and the validity of the reform demands, it argues that the increase in permanent seats and particularly the use of veto authority would tend to have a detrimental impact on institutional paralysis. It concludes that India can have a better seat in a reformed Council, although the chances of getting permanent membership with a veto power are few with the current geopolitical limitations.