Analyzing The South Asian Strategic Stability in the Light of Game Theory

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic, political and economic dynamics that frame Pakistan’s evolving geo-strategic landscape in South Asia. It especially analyzes the implications of limited war theories, surgical strikes, conventional disparities and the resultant security conundrum in India–Pakistan relations. The paper asserts that India’s military modernization and strategic doctrine shift affects Pakistan’s evolving deterrence posture, which necessitates a greater reliance on tactical nuclear weapons and employment of asymmetric strategies. Furthermore, it examines the overall security implications of arms race for Pakistan’s economy and development efforts. The paper also explores the risks of increased militarization under the nuclear umbrella, including misperceptions that could lead to unintended conflict in the light of Game Theory. Employing both theory and empirical evidence, the paper maps out the foreign and security strategies that guide Pakistan’s state and military actors. It also offers insights and policy recommendations regarding stable deterrence, easing economic burdens and national security in a volatile region.